Files
hakmem/core/tiny_superslab_free.inc.h
Moe Charm (CI) 72b38bc994 Phase E3-FINAL: Fix Box API offset bugs - ALL classes now use correct offsets
## Root Cause Analysis (GPT5)

**Physical Layout Constraints**:
- Class 0: 8B = [1B header][7B payload] → offset 1 = 9B needed =  IMPOSSIBLE
- Class 1-6: >=16B = [1B header][15B+ payload] → offset 1 =  POSSIBLE
- Class 7: 1KB → offset 0 (compatibility)

**Correct Specification**:
- HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX != 0:
  - Class 0, 7: next at offset 0 (overwrites header when on freelist)
  - Class 1-6: next at offset 1 (after header)
- HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX == 0:
  - All classes: next at offset 0

**Previous Bug**:
- Attempted "ALL classes offset 1" unification
- Class 0 with offset 1 caused immediate SEGV (9B > 8B block size)
- Mixed 2-arg/3-arg API caused confusion

## Fixes Applied

### 1. Restored 3-Argument Box API (core/box/tiny_next_ptr_box.h)
```c
// Correct signatures
void tiny_next_write(int class_idx, void* base, void* next_value)
void* tiny_next_read(int class_idx, const void* base)

// Correct offset calculation
size_t offset = (class_idx == 0 || class_idx == 7) ? 0 : 1;
```

### 2. Updated 123+ Call Sites Across 34 Files
- hakmem_tiny_hot_pop_v4.inc.h (4 locations)
- hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (3 locations)
- hakmem_tiny_tls_list.h (12 locations)
- superslab_inline.h (5 locations)
- tiny_fastcache.h (3 locations)
- ptr_trace.h (macro definitions)
- tls_sll_box.h (2 locations)
- + 27 additional files

Pattern: `tiny_next_read(base)` → `tiny_next_read(class_idx, base)`
Pattern: `tiny_next_write(base, next)` → `tiny_next_write(class_idx, base, next)`

### 3. Added Sentinel Detection Guards
- tiny_fast_push(): Block nodes with sentinel in ptr or ptr->next
- tls_list_push(): Block nodes with sentinel in ptr or ptr->next
- Defense-in-depth against remote free sentinel leakage

## Verification (GPT5 Report)

**Test Command**: `./out/release/bench_random_mixed_hakmem --iterations=70000`

**Results**:
-  Main loop completed successfully
-  Drain phase completed successfully
-  NO SEGV (previous crash at iteration 66151 is FIXED)
- ℹ️ Final log: "tiny_alloc(1024) failed" is normal fallback to Mid/ACE layers

**Analysis**:
- Class 0 immediate SEGV:  RESOLVED (correct offset 0 now used)
- 66K iteration crash:  RESOLVED (offset consistency fixed)
- Box API conflicts:  RESOLVED (unified 3-arg API)

## Technical Details

### Offset Logic Justification
```
Class 0:  8B block → next pointer (8B) fits ONLY at offset 0
Class 1: 16B block → next pointer (8B) fits at offset 1 (after 1B header)
Class 2: 32B block → next pointer (8B) fits at offset 1
...
Class 6: 512B block → next pointer (8B) fits at offset 1
Class 7: 1024B block → offset 0 for legacy compatibility
```

### Files Modified (Summary)
- Core API: `box/tiny_next_ptr_box.h`
- Hot paths: `hakmem_tiny_hot_pop*.inc.h`, `tiny_fastcache.h`
- TLS layers: `hakmem_tiny_tls_list.h`, `hakmem_tiny_tls_ops.h`
- SuperSlab: `superslab_inline.h`, `tiny_superslab_*.inc.h`
- Refill: `hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h`, `tiny_refill_opt.h`
- Free paths: `tiny_free_magazine.inc.h`, `tiny_superslab_free.inc.h`
- Documentation: Multiple Phase E3 reports

## Remaining Work

None for Box API offset bugs - all structural issues resolved.

Future enhancements (non-critical):
- Periodic `grep -R '*(void**)' core/` to detect direct pointer access violations
- Enforce Box API usage via static analysis
- Document offset rationale in architecture docs

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-13 06:50:20 +09:00

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// tiny_superslab_free.inc.h - SuperSlab Free Layer
// Purpose: Same-thread and cross-thread free handling
// Extracted from: hakmem_tiny_free.inc lines 1171-1475
// Box Theory: Box 6 (Free Fast Path) + Box 2 (Remote Queue) integration
//
// Public functions:
// - hak_tiny_free_superslab(): Main SuperSlab free entry point
// Phase 6.22-B: SuperSlab fast free path
static inline void hak_tiny_free_superslab(void* ptr, SuperSlab* ss) {
// Route trace: count SuperSlab free entries (diagnostics only)
extern _Atomic uint64_t g_free_ss_enter;
atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&g_free_ss_enter, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
ROUTE_MARK(16); // free_enter
HAK_DBG_INC(g_superslab_free_count); // Phase 7.6: Track SuperSlab frees
// ✅ FIX: Convert USER → BASE at entry point (single conversion)
// Phase E1-CORRECT: ALL classes (C0-C7) have 1-byte header
// ptr = USER pointer (storage+1), base = BASE pointer (storage)
void* base = (void*)((uint8_t*)ptr - 1);
// Get slab index (supports 1MB/2MB SuperSlabs)
// CRITICAL: Use BASE pointer for slab_index calculation!
int slab_idx = slab_index_for(ss, base);
size_t ss_size = (size_t)1ULL << ss->lg_size;
uintptr_t ss_base = (uintptr_t)ss;
if (__builtin_expect(slab_idx < 0, 0)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xBAD1u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
TinySlabMeta* meta = &ss->slabs[slab_idx];
// Debug: Log first C7 alloc/free for path verification
if (ss->size_class == 7) {
static _Atomic int c7_free_count = 0;
int count = atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&c7_free_count, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
if (count == 0) {
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE && HAKMEM_DEBUG_VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr, "[C7_FIRST_FREE] ptr=%p base=%p slab_idx=%d\n", ptr, base, slab_idx);
#endif
}
}
if (__builtin_expect(tiny_remote_watch_is(ptr), 0)) {
tiny_remote_watch_note("free_enter", ss, slab_idx, ptr, 0xA240u, tiny_self_u32(), 0);
extern __thread TinyTLSSlab g_tls_slabs[];
tiny_alloc_dump_tls_state(ss->size_class, "watch_free_enter", &g_tls_slabs[ss->size_class]);
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
extern __thread TinyTLSMag g_tls_mags[];
TinyTLSMag* watch_mag = &g_tls_mags[ss->size_class];
fprintf(stderr,
"[REMOTE_WATCH_MAG] cls=%u mag_top=%d cap=%d\n",
ss->size_class,
watch_mag->top,
watch_mag->cap);
#endif
}
// BUGFIX: Validate size_class before using as array index (prevents OOB)
if (__builtin_expect(ss->size_class < 0 || ss->size_class >= TINY_NUM_CLASSES, 0)) {
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, 0xF1, ptr, (uintptr_t)ss->size_class);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
// ChatGPT Pro Optimization: Move safety checks to debug mode only
// In release builds, these checks are completely eliminated by the compiler
// Expected impact: -10~-15% CPU (eliminates O(n) duplicate scan)
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
if (__builtin_expect(g_tiny_safe_free, 0)) {
size_t blk = g_tiny_class_sizes[ss->size_class];
uint8_t* base = tiny_slab_base_for(ss, slab_idx);
uintptr_t delta = (uintptr_t)ptr - (uintptr_t)base;
int cap_ok = (meta->capacity > 0) ? 1 : 0;
int align_ok = (delta % blk) == 0;
int range_ok = cap_ok && (delta / blk) < meta->capacity;
if (!align_ok || !range_ok) {
uint32_t code = 0xA100u;
if (align_ok) code |= 0x2u;
if (range_ok) code |= 0x1u;
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(code, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
// Duplicate in freelist (best-effort scan up to 64)
// NOTE: This O(n) scan is VERY expensive (can scan 64 pointers per free!)
void* scan = meta->freelist; int scanned = 0; int dup = 0;
while (scan && scanned < 64) { if (scan == base) { dup = 1; break; } scan = tiny_next_read(ss->size_class, scan); scanned++; }
if (dup) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xDFu, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
}
#endif // !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
// Phase E1-CORRECT: C7 now has headers like other classes
// Validation must check base pointer (ptr-1) alignment, not user pointer
if (__builtin_expect(ss->size_class == 7, 0)) {
size_t blk = g_tiny_class_sizes[ss->size_class];
uint8_t* slab_base = tiny_slab_base_for(ss, slab_idx);
uintptr_t delta = (uintptr_t)base - (uintptr_t)slab_base;
int cap_ok = (meta->capacity > 0) ? 1 : 0;
int align_ok = (delta % blk) == 0;
int range_ok = cap_ok && (delta / blk) < meta->capacity;
if (!align_ok || !range_ok) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA107u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
// Debug build: Print diagnostic info before failing
fprintf(stderr, "[C7_ALIGN_CHECK_FAIL] ptr=%p base=%p slab_base=%p\n", ptr, base, (void*)slab_base);
fprintf(stderr, "[C7_ALIGN_CHECK_FAIL] delta=%zu blk=%zu delta%%blk=%zu\n",
(size_t)delta, blk, (size_t)(delta % blk));
fprintf(stderr, "[C7_ALIGN_CHECK_FAIL] align_ok=%d range_ok=%d cap=%u capacity=%u\n",
align_ok, range_ok, (unsigned)(delta / blk), (unsigned)meta->capacity);
#endif
// BUGFIX: Guard with g_tiny_safe_free_strict like other validation checks
// Fail-fast in class7 to avoid silent SLL/freelist corruption (only if strict mode enabled)
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); }
return;
}
}
// Phase 6.23: Same-thread check
uint32_t my_tid = tiny_self_u32();
const int debug_guard = g_debug_remote_guard;
static __thread int g_debug_free_count = 0;
// If owner is not set yet, claim ownership to avoid spurious remote path in 1T
if (!g_tiny_force_remote && meta->owner_tid == 0) {
meta->owner_tid = my_tid;
}
if (!g_tiny_force_remote && meta->owner_tid != 0 && meta->owner_tid == my_tid) {
ROUTE_MARK(17); // free_same_thread
// Fast path: Direct freelist push (same-thread)
if (0 && debug_guard && g_debug_free_count < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "[FREE_SS] SAME-THREAD: owner=%u my=%u\n",
meta->owner_tid, my_tid);
g_debug_free_count++;
}
if (__builtin_expect(meta->used == 0, 0)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0x00u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
tiny_remote_track_expect_alloc(ss, slab_idx, ptr, "local_free_enter", my_tid);
if (!tiny_remote_guard_allow_local_push(ss, slab_idx, meta, ptr, "local_free", my_tid)) {
#include "box/free_remote_box.h"
int transitioned = tiny_free_remote_box(ss, slab_idx, meta, base, my_tid);
if (transitioned) {
extern unsigned long long g_remote_free_transitions[];
g_remote_free_transitions[ss->size_class]++;
// Free-side route: remote transition observed
do {
static int g_route_free = -1; if (__builtin_expect(g_route_free == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_ROUTE_FREE");
g_route_free = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0; }
if (g_route_free) route_free_commit((int)ss->size_class, (1ull<<18), 0xE2);
} while (0);
}
return;
}
// Optional: MidTC (TLS tcache for 128..1024B) — allow bypass via env HAKMEM_TINY_FREE_TO_SS=1
do {
static int g_free_to_ss = -1;
if (__builtin_expect(g_free_to_ss == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_FREE_TO_SS");
g_free_to_ss = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0; // default OFF
}
if (!g_free_to_ss) {
int cls = (int)ss->size_class;
if (midtc_enabled() && cls >= 4) {
if (midtc_push(cls, base)) {
// Treat as returned to TLS cache (not SS freelist)
meta->used--;
ss_active_dec_one(ss);
return;
}
}
}
} while (0);
#include "box/free_local_box.h"
// Perform freelist push (+first-free publish if applicable)
void* prev_before = meta->freelist;
tiny_free_local_box(ss, slab_idx, meta, base, my_tid);
if (prev_before == NULL) {
ROUTE_MARK(19); // first_free_transition
extern unsigned long long g_first_free_transitions[];
g_first_free_transitions[ss->size_class]++;
ROUTE_MARK(20); // mailbox_publish
// Free-side route commit (one-shot)
do {
static int g_route_free = -1; if (__builtin_expect(g_route_free == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_ROUTE_FREE");
g_route_free = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0; }
int cls = (int)ss->size_class;
if (g_route_free) route_free_commit(cls, (1ull<<19) | (1ull<<20), 0xE1);
} while (0);
}
if (__builtin_expect(debug_guard, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "[REMOTE_LOCAL] cls=%u slab=%d owner=%u my=%u ptr=%p prev=%p used=%u\n",
ss->size_class, slab_idx, meta->owner_tid, my_tid, ptr, prev_before, meta->used);
}
// 空検出は別途(ホットパス除外)
} else {
ROUTE_MARK(18); // free_remote_transition
if (__builtin_expect(meta->owner_tid == my_tid && meta->owner_tid == 0, 0)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA300u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (debug_guard) {
fprintf(stderr, "[REMOTE_OWNER_ZERO] cls=%u slab=%d ptr=%p my=%u used=%u\n",
ss->size_class, slab_idx, ptr, my_tid, (unsigned)meta->used);
}
}
tiny_remote_track_expect_alloc(ss, slab_idx, ptr, "remote_free_enter", my_tid);
// Slow path: Remote free (cross-thread)
if (0 && debug_guard && g_debug_free_count < 5) {
fprintf(stderr, "[FREE_SS] CROSS-THREAD: owner=%u my=%u slab_idx=%d\n",
meta->owner_tid, my_tid, slab_idx);
g_debug_free_count++;
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_tiny_safe_free, 0)) {
// Best-effort duplicate scan in remote stack (up to 64 nodes)
uintptr_t head = atomic_load_explicit(&ss->remote_heads[slab_idx], memory_order_acquire);
uintptr_t base = ss_base;
int scanned = 0; int dup = 0;
uintptr_t cur = head;
while (cur && scanned < 64) {
if ((cur < base) || (cur >= base + ss_size)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA200u, base, ss_size, cur);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, (void*)cur, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
break;
}
if ((void*)cur == ptr) { dup = 1; break; }
if (__builtin_expect(g_remote_side_enable, 0)) {
if (!tiny_remote_sentinel_ok((void*)cur)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA202u, base, ss_size, cur);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, (void*)cur, aux);
uintptr_t observed = atomic_load_explicit((_Atomic uintptr_t*)(void*)cur, memory_order_relaxed);
tiny_remote_report_corruption("scan", (void*)cur, observed);
if (__builtin_expect(g_debug_remote_guard, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[REMOTE_SENTINEL] cls=%u slab=%d cur=%p head=%p ptr=%p scanned=%d observed=0x%016" PRIxPTR " owner=%u used=%u freelist=%p remote_head=%p\n",
ss->size_class,
slab_idx,
(void*)cur,
(void*)head,
ptr,
scanned,
observed,
meta->owner_tid,
(unsigned)meta->used,
meta->freelist,
(void*)atomic_load_explicit(&ss->remote_heads[slab_idx], memory_order_relaxed));
}
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
break;
}
cur = tiny_remote_side_get(ss, slab_idx, (void*)cur);
} else {
if ((cur & (uintptr_t)(sizeof(void*) - 1)) != 0) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA201u, base, ss_size, cur);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, (void*)cur, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
break;
}
cur = (uintptr_t)tiny_next_read(ss->size_class, (void*)cur);
}
scanned++;
}
if (dup) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xD1u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
}
if (__builtin_expect(meta->used == 0, 0)) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0x01u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
if (g_tiny_safe_free_strict) { raise(SIGUSR2); return; }
return;
}
static int g_ss_adopt_en2 = -1; // env cached
if (g_ss_adopt_en2 == -1) {
char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_SS_ADOPT");
// 既定: Remote Queueを使う1。env指定時のみ上書き。
g_ss_adopt_en2 = (e == NULL) ? 1 : ((*e != '0') ? 1 : 0);
if (__builtin_expect(debug_guard, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "[FREE_SS] g_ss_adopt_en2=%d (env='%s')\n", g_ss_adopt_en2, e ? e : "(null)");
}
}
// A/B gate: disable remote MPSC (use legacy freelist push)
do {
static int g_disable_remote = -1;
if (__builtin_expect(g_disable_remote == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_DISABLE_REMOTE");
g_disable_remote = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_disable_remote, 0)) {
g_ss_adopt_en2 = 0;
}
} while (0);
if (g_ss_adopt_en2) {
// Use remote queue
uintptr_t head_word = __atomic_load_n((uintptr_t*)base, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
if (debug_guard) fprintf(stderr, "[REMOTE_PUSH_CALL] cls=%u slab=%d owner=%u my=%u ptr=%p used=%u remote_count=%u head=%p word=0x%016" PRIxPTR "\n",
ss->size_class,
slab_idx,
meta->owner_tid,
my_tid,
ptr,
(unsigned)meta->used,
atomic_load_explicit(&ss->remote_counts[slab_idx], memory_order_relaxed),
(void*)atomic_load_explicit(&ss->remote_heads[slab_idx], memory_order_relaxed),
head_word);
int dup_remote = tiny_remote_queue_contains_guard(ss, slab_idx, base);
if (!dup_remote && __builtin_expect(g_remote_side_enable, 0)) {
dup_remote = (head_word == TINY_REMOTE_SENTINEL) || tiny_remote_side_contains(ss, slab_idx, base);
}
if (__builtin_expect(head_word == TINY_REMOTE_SENTINEL && !dup_remote && g_debug_remote_guard, 0)) {
tiny_remote_watch_note("dup_scan_miss", ss, slab_idx, ptr, 0xA215u, my_tid, 0);
}
if (dup_remote) {
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA214u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_remote_watch_mark(ptr, "dup_prevent", my_tid);
tiny_remote_watch_note("dup_prevent", ss, slab_idx, ptr, 0xA214u, my_tid, 0);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
tiny_failfast_abort_ptr("double_free_remote", ss, slab_idx, ptr, "remote_side_contains");
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_remote_side_enable && (head_word & 0xFFFFu) == 0x6261u, 0)) {
// TLS guard scribble detected on the node's first word → same-pointer double free across routes
uintptr_t aux = tiny_remote_pack_diag(0xA213u, ss_base, ss_size, (uintptr_t)ptr);
tiny_debug_ring_record(TINY_RING_EVENT_REMOTE_INVALID, (uint16_t)ss->size_class, ptr, aux);
tiny_remote_watch_mark(ptr, "pre_push", my_tid);
tiny_remote_watch_note("pre_push", ss, slab_idx, ptr, 0xA231u, my_tid, 0);
tiny_remote_report_corruption("pre_push", ptr, head_word);
tiny_failfast_abort_ptr("double_free_scribble", ss, slab_idx, ptr, "scribble_6261");
}
if (__builtin_expect(tiny_remote_watch_is(ptr), 0)) {
tiny_remote_watch_note("free_remote", ss, slab_idx, ptr, 0xA232u, my_tid, 0);
}
int was_empty = ss_remote_push(ss, slab_idx, base); // ss_active_dec_one() called inside
meta->used--;
// ss_active_dec_one(ss); // REMOVED: Already called inside ss_remote_push()
if (was_empty) {
extern unsigned long long g_remote_free_transitions[];
g_remote_free_transitions[ss->size_class]++;
ss_partial_publish((int)ss->size_class, ss);
}
} else {
// Fallback: direct freelist push (legacy)
if (debug_guard) fprintf(stderr, "[FREE_SS] Using LEGACY freelist push (not remote queue)\n");
void* prev = meta->freelist;
tiny_next_write(ss->size_class, base, prev);
meta->freelist = base;
tiny_failfast_log("free_local_legacy", ss->size_class, ss, meta, ptr, prev);
do {
static int g_mask_en = -1;
if (__builtin_expect(g_mask_en == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_FREELIST_MASK");
g_mask_en = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_mask_en, 0) && prev == NULL) {
uint32_t bit = (1u << slab_idx);
atomic_fetch_or_explicit(&ss->freelist_mask, bit, memory_order_release);
}
} while (0);
meta->used--;
ss_active_dec_one(ss);
if (prev == NULL) {
ss_partial_publish((int)ss->size_class, ss);
}
}
// 空検出は別途(ホットパス除外)
}
}