Files
hakmem/core/box
Moe Charm (CI) 8b67718bf2 Fix C7 TLS SLL corruption: Protect next pointer from user data overwrites
## Root Cause
C7 (1024B allocations, 2048B stride) was using offset=1 for freelist next
pointers, storing them at `base[1..8]`. Since user pointer is `base+1`, users
could overwrite the next pointer area, corrupting the TLS SLL freelist.

## The Bug Sequence
1. Block freed → TLS SLL push stores next at `base[1..8]`
2. Block allocated → User gets `base+1`, can modify `base[1..2047]`
3. User writes data → Overwrites `base[1..8]` (next pointer area!)
4. Block freed again → tiny_next_load() reads garbage from `base[1..8]`
5. TLS SLL head becomes invalid (0xfe, 0xdb, 0x58, etc.)

## Why This Was Reverted
Previous fix (C7 offset=0) was reverted with comment:
  "C7も header を保持して class 判別を壊さないことを優先"
  (Prioritize preserving C7 header to avoid breaking class identification)

This reasoning was FLAWED because:
- Header IS restored during allocation (HAK_RET_ALLOC), not freelist ops
- Class identification at free time reads from ptr-1 = base[0] (after restoration)
- During freelist, header CAN be sacrificed (not visible to user)
- The revert CREATED the race condition by exposing base[1..8] to user

## Fix Applied

### 1. Revert C7 offset to 0 (tiny_nextptr.h:54)
```c
// BEFORE (BROKEN):
return (class_idx == 0) ? 0u : 1u;

// AFTER (FIXED):
return (class_idx == 0 || class_idx == 7) ? 0u : 1u;
```

### 2. Remove C7 header restoration in freelist (tiny_nextptr.h:84)
```c
// BEFORE (BROKEN):
if (class_idx != 0) {  // Restores header for all classes including C7

// AFTER (FIXED):
if (class_idx != 0 && class_idx != 7) {  // Only C1-C6 restore headers
```

### 3. Bonus: Remove premature slab release (tls_sll_drain_box.h:182-189)
Removed `shared_pool_release_slab()` call from drain path that could cause
use-after-free when blocks from same slab remain in TLS SLL.

## Why This Fix Works

**Memory Layout** (C7 in freelist):
```
Address:     base      base+1        base+2048
            ┌────┬──────────────────────┐
Content:    │next│  (user accessible)  │
            └────┴──────────────────────┘
            8B ptr  ← USER CANNOT TOUCH base[0]
```

- **Next pointer at base[0]**: Protected from user modification ✓
- **User pointer at base+1**: User sees base[1..2047] only ✓
- **Header restored during allocation**: HAK_RET_ALLOC writes 0xa7 at base[0] ✓
- **Class ID preserved**: tiny_region_id_read_header(ptr) reads ptr-1 = base[0] ✓

## Verification Results

### Before Fix
- **Errors**: 33 TLS_SLL_POP_INVALID per 100K iterations (0.033%)
- **Performance**: 1.8M ops/s (corruption caused slow path fallback)
- **Symptoms**: Invalid TLS SLL heads (0xfe, 0xdb, 0x58, 0x80, 0xc2, etc.)

### After Fix
- **Errors**: 0 per 200K iterations 
- **Performance**: 10.0M ops/s (+456%!) 
- **C7 direct test**: 5.5M ops/s, 100K iterations, 0 errors 

## Files Modified
- core/tiny_nextptr.h (lines 49-54, 82-84) - C7 offset=0, no header restoration
- core/box/tls_sll_drain_box.h (lines 182-189) - Remove premature slab release

## Architectural Lesson

**Design Principle**: Freelist metadata MUST be stored in memory NOT accessible to user.

| Class | Offset | Next Storage | User Access | Result |
|-------|--------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| C0 | 0 | base[0] | base[1..7] | Safe ✓ |
| C1-C6 | 1 | base[1..8] | base[1..N] | Safe (header at base[0]) ✓ |
| C7 (broken) | 1 | base[1..8] | base[1..2047] | **CORRUPTED** ✗ |
| C7 (fixed) | 0 | base[0] | base[1..2047] | Safe ✓ |

🧹 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-21 23:42:43 +09:00
..