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hakmem/core/box/tls_sll_box.h

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// tls_sll_box.h - Box TLS-SLL: Single-Linked List API (Unified Box version)
//
// Goal:
// - Single authoritative Box for TLS SLL operations.
// - All next pointer layout is decided by tiny_next_ptr_box.h (Box API).
// - Callers pass BASE pointers only; no local next_offset arithmetic.
// - Compatible with existing ptr_trace PTR_NEXT_* macros (off is logging-only).
//
// Invariants:
// - g_tiny_class_sizes[cls] is TOTAL stride (including 1-byte header when enabled).
// - For HEADER_CLASSIDX != 0, tiny_nextptr.h encodes:
// class 0: next_off = 0
// class 1-6: next_off = 1
// class 7: next_off = 0
// Callers MUST NOT duplicate this logic.
// - TLS SLL stores BASE pointers only.
// - Box provides: push / pop / splice with capacity & integrity checks.
#ifndef TLS_SLL_BOX_H
#define TLS_SLL_BOX_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "../hakmem_tiny_config.h"
#include "../hakmem_build_flags.h"
#include "../tiny_remote.h"
#include "../tiny_region_id.h"
#include "../hakmem_tiny_integrity.h"
#include "../ptr_track.h"
#include "../ptr_trace.h"
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
#include "../tiny_debug_ring.h"
#include "tiny_next_ptr_box.h"
// Phase 3d-B: Unified TLS SLL (defined in hakmem_tiny.c)
extern __thread TinyTLSSLL g_tls_sll[TINY_NUM_CLASSES];
extern int g_tls_sll_class_mask; // bit i=1 → SLL allowed for class i
// ========== Debug guard ==========
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
static inline void tls_sll_debug_guard(int class_idx, void* base, const char* where)
{
(void)class_idx;
if ((uintptr_t)base < 4096) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_GUARD] %s: suspicious ptr=%p cls=%d\n",
where, base, class_idx);
abort();
}
}
#else
static inline void tls_sll_debug_guard(int class_idx, void* base, const char* where)
{
(void)class_idx; (void)base; (void)where;
}
#endif
// Normalize helper: callers are required to pass BASE already.
// Kept as a no-op for documentation / future hardening.
static inline void* tls_sll_normalize_base(int class_idx, void* node)
{
(void)class_idx;
return node;
}
// ========== Push ==========
//
// Push BASE pointer into TLS SLL for given class.
// Returns true on success, false if capacity full or input invalid.
static inline bool tls_sll_push(int class_idx, void* ptr, uint32_t capacity)
{
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
HAK_CHECK_CLASS_IDX(class_idx, "tls_sll_push");
// Class mask gate (narrow triage): if disallowed, reject push
if (__builtin_expect(((g_tls_sll_class_mask & (1u << class_idx)) == 0), 0)) {
return false;
}
// Capacity semantics:
// - capacity == 0 → disabled (reject)
// - capacity > 1<<20 → treat as "unbounded" sentinel (no limit)
if (capacity == 0) {
return false;
}
const uint32_t kCapacityHardMax = (1u << 20);
const int unlimited = (capacity > kCapacityHardMax);
if (!ptr) {
return false;
}
// Base pointer only (callers must pass BASE; this is a no-op by design).
ptr = tls_sll_normalize_base(class_idx, ptr);
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
// Minimal range guard before we touch memory.
if (!validate_ptr_range(ptr, "tls_sll_push_base")) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_PUSH] FATAL invalid BASE ptr cls=%d base=%p\n",
class_idx, ptr);
abort();
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
}
#endif
// Capacity check BEFORE any writes.
uint32_t cur = g_tls_sll[class_idx].count;
if (!unlimited && cur >= capacity) {
return false;
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
}
#if HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX
// Header handling for header classes (class != 0,7).
// Safe mode (HAKMEM_TINY_SLL_SAFEHEADER=1): never overwrite header; reject on magic mismatch.
// Default mode: restore expected header.
if (class_idx != 0 && class_idx != 7) {
static int g_sll_safehdr = -1;
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
static int g_sll_ring_en = -1; // optional ring trace for TLS-SLL anomalies
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_safehdr == -1, 0)) {
const char* e = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_SLL_SAFEHEADER");
g_sll_safehdr = (e && *e && *e != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en == -1, 0)) {
const char* r = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_SLL_RING");
g_sll_ring_en = (r && *r && *r != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
uint8_t* b = (uint8_t*)ptr;
uint8_t expected = (uint8_t)(HEADER_MAGIC | (class_idx & HEADER_CLASS_MASK));
if (g_sll_safehdr) {
uint8_t got = *b;
if ((got & 0xF0u) != HEADER_MAGIC) {
// Reject push silently (fall back to slow path at caller)
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en, 0)) {
// aux encodes: high 8 bits = got, low 8 bits = expected
uintptr_t aux = ((uintptr_t)got << 8) | (uintptr_t)expected;
tiny_debug_ring_record(0x7F10 /*TLS_SLL_REJECT*/, (uint16_t)class_idx, ptr, aux);
}
return false;
}
} else {
PTR_TRACK_TLS_PUSH(ptr, class_idx);
PTR_TRACK_HEADER_WRITE(ptr, expected);
*b = expected;
}
}
#endif
tls_sll_debug_guard(class_idx, ptr, "push");
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
// Optional double-free detection: scan a bounded prefix of the list.
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
{
void* scan = g_tls_sll[class_idx].head;
uint32_t scanned = 0;
const uint32_t limit = (g_tls_sll[class_idx].count < 64)
? g_tls_sll[class_idx].count
: 64;
while (scan && scanned < limit) {
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
if (scan == ptr) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_PUSH] FATAL double-free: cls=%d ptr=%p already in SLL\n",
class_idx, ptr);
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
ptr_trace_dump_now("double_free");
abort();
}
void* next;
PTR_NEXT_READ("tls_sll_scan", class_idx, scan, 0, next);
scan = next;
scanned++;
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
}
}
#endif
// Link new node to current head via Box API (offset is handled inside tiny_nextptr).
PTR_NEXT_WRITE("tls_push", class_idx, ptr, 0, g_tls_sll[class_idx].head);
g_tls_sll[class_idx].head = ptr;
g_tls_sll[class_idx].count = cur + 1;
return true;
}
// ========== Pop ==========
//
// Pop BASE pointer from TLS SLL.
// Returns true on success and stores BASE into *out.
static inline bool tls_sll_pop(int class_idx, void** out)
{
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
HAK_CHECK_CLASS_IDX(class_idx, "tls_sll_pop");
// Class mask gate: if disallowed, behave as empty
if (__builtin_expect(((g_tls_sll_class_mask & (1u << class_idx)) == 0), 0)) {
return false;
}
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
atomic_fetch_add(&g_integrity_check_class_bounds, 1);
void* base = g_tls_sll[class_idx].head;
if (!base) {
return false;
}
// Sentinel guard: remote sentinel must never be in TLS SLL.
Add sentinel detection guards (defense-in-depth) PARTIAL FIX: Add sentinel detection at 3 critical push points to prevent sentinel-poisoned nodes from entering TLS caches. These guards provide defense-in-depth against remote free sentinel leaks. Sentinel Attack Vector (from Task agent analysis): 1. Remote free writes SENTINEL (0xBADA55BADA55BADA) to node->next 2. Node propagates through: freelist → TLS list → fast cache 3. Fast cache pop tries to dereference sentinel → SEGV Fixes Applied: 1. **tls_sll_pop()** (core/box/tls_sll_box.h:235-252) - Check if TLS SLL head == SENTINEL before dereferencing - Reset TLS state and log detection - Trigger refill path instead of crash 2. **tiny_fast_push()** (core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h:105-130) - Check both `ptr` and `ptr->next` for sentinel before pushing to fast cache - Reject sentinel-poisoned nodes with logging - Prevents sentinel from reaching the critical pop path 3. **tls_list_push()** (core/hakmem_tiny_tls_list.h:69-91) - Check both `node` and `node->next` for sentinel before pushing to TLS list - Defense-in-depth layer to catch sentinel earlier in the pipeline - Prevents propagation to downstream caches Logging Strategy: - Limited to 5 occurrences per thread (prevents log spam) - Identifies which class and pointer triggered detection - Helps trace sentinel leak source Current Status: ⚠️ Sentinel checks added but NOT yet effective - bench_random_mixed 100K: Still crashes at iteration 66152 - NO sentinel detection logs appear - Suggests either: 1. Sentinel is not the root cause 2. Crash happens before checks are reached 3. Different code path is active Further Investigation Needed: - Disassemble crash location to identify exact code path - Check if HAKMEM_TINY_AGGRESSIVE_INLINE uses different code - Investigate alternative crash causes (buffer overflow, use-after-free, etc.) Testing: - bench_random_mixed_hakmem 1K-66K: PASS (8M ops/s) - bench_random_mixed_hakmem 67K+: FAIL (crashes at 66152) - Sentinel logs: NONE (checks not triggered) Related: Previous commit fixed 8 USER/BASE conversion bugs (14K→66K stability) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-13 05:43:31 +09:00
if (__builtin_expect((uintptr_t)base == TINY_REMOTE_SENTINEL, 0)) {
g_tls_sll[class_idx].head = NULL;
g_tls_sll[class_idx].count = 0;
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_POP] Remote sentinel detected at head; SLL reset (cls=%d)\n",
class_idx);
#endif
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
{
static int g_sll_ring_en = -1;
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en == -1, 0)) {
const char* r = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_SLL_RING");
g_sll_ring_en = (r && *r && *r != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en, 0)) {
tiny_debug_ring_record(0x7F11 /*TLS_SLL_SENTINEL*/, (uint16_t)class_idx, base, 0);
}
}
return false;
}
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
if (!validate_ptr_range(base, "tls_sll_pop_base")) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_POP] FATAL invalid BASE ptr cls=%d base=%p\n",
class_idx, base);
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
abort();
}
#endif
tls_sll_debug_guard(class_idx, base, "pop");
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
#if HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX
// Header validation for header-classes (class != 0,7).
Box API Phase 1-3: Capacity Manager, Carve-Push, Prewarm 実装 Priority 1-3のBox Modulesを実装し、安全なpre-warming APIを提供。 既存の複雑なprewarmコードを1行のBox API呼び出しに置き換え。 ## 新規Box Modules 1. **Box Capacity Manager** (capacity_box.h/c) - TLS SLL容量の一元管理 - adaptive_sizing初期化保証 - Double-free バグ防止 2. **Box Carve-And-Push** (carve_push_box.h/c) - アトミックなblock carve + TLS SLL push - All-or-nothing semantics - Rollback保証(partial failure防止) 3. **Box Prewarm** (prewarm_box.h/c) - 安全なTLS cache pre-warming - 初期化依存性を隠蔽 - シンプルなAPI (1関数呼び出し) ## コード簡略化 hakmem_tiny_init.inc: 20行 → 1行 ```c // BEFORE: 複雑なP0分岐とエラー処理 adaptive_sizing_init(); if (prewarm > 0) { #if HAKMEM_TINY_P0_BATCH_REFILL int taken = sll_refill_batch_from_ss(5, prewarm); #else int taken = sll_refill_small_from_ss(5, prewarm); #endif } // AFTER: Box API 1行 int taken = box_prewarm_tls(5, prewarm); ``` ## シンボルExport修正 hakmem_tiny.c: 5つのシンボルをstatic → non-static - g_tls_slabs[] (TLS slab配列) - g_sll_multiplier (SLL容量乗数) - g_sll_cap_override[] (容量オーバーライド) - superslab_refill() (SuperSlab再充填) - ss_active_add() (アクティブカウンタ) ## ビルドシステム Makefile: TINY_BENCH_OBJS_BASEに3つのBox modules追加 - core/box/capacity_box.o - core/box/carve_push_box.o - core/box/prewarm_box.o ## 動作確認 ✅ Debug build成功 ✅ Box Prewarm API動作確認 [PREWARM] class=5 requested=128 taken=32 ## 次のステップ - Box Refill Manager (Priority 4) - Box SuperSlab Allocator (Priority 5) - Release build修正(tiny_debug_ring_record) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-13 01:45:30 +09:00
if (class_idx != 0 && class_idx != 7) {
uint8_t got = *(uint8_t*)base;
uint8_t expect = (uint8_t)(HEADER_MAGIC | (class_idx & HEADER_CLASS_MASK));
PTR_TRACK_TLS_POP(base, class_idx);
PTR_TRACK_HEADER_READ(base, got);
if (__builtin_expect(got != expect, 0)) {
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_POP] CORRUPTED HEADER cls=%d base=%p got=0x%02x expect=0x%02x\n",
class_idx, base, got, expect);
ptr_trace_dump_now("header_corruption");
abort();
#else
// In release, fail-safe: drop list.
g_tls_sll[class_idx].head = NULL;
g_tls_sll[class_idx].count = 0;
Front-Direct implementation: SS→FC direct refill + SLL complete bypass ## Summary Implemented Front-Direct architecture with complete SLL bypass: - Direct SuperSlab → FastCache refill (1-hop, bypasses SLL) - SLL-free allocation/free paths when Front-Direct enabled - Legacy path sealing (SLL inline opt-in, SFC cascade ENV-only) ## New Modules - core/refill/ss_refill_fc.h (236 lines): Standard SS→FC refill entry point - Remote drain → Freelist → Carve priority - Header restoration for C1-C6 (NOT C0/C7) - ENV: HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DRAIN_THRESH, HAKMEM_TINY_P0_NO_DRAIN - core/front/fast_cache.h: FastCache (L1) type definition - core/front/quick_slot.h: QuickSlot (L0) type definition ## Allocation Path (core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h) - Added s_front_direct_alloc TLS flag (lazy ENV check) - SLL pop guarded by: g_tls_sll_enable && !s_front_direct_alloc - Refill dispatch: - Front-Direct: ss_refill_fc_fill() → fastcache_pop() (1-hop) - Legacy: sll_refill_batch_from_ss() → SLL → FC (2-hop, A/B only) - SLL inline pop sealed (requires HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1 opt-in) ## Free Path (core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc, core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h) - FC priority: Try fastcache_push() first (same-thread free) - tiny_fast_push() bypass: Returns 0 when s_front_direct_free || !g_tls_sll_enable - Fallback: Magazine/slow path (safe, bypasses SLL) ## Legacy Sealing - SFC cascade: Default OFF (ENV-only via HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1) - Deleted: core/hakmem_tiny_free.inc.bak, core/pool_refill_legacy.c.bak - Documentation: ss_refill_fc_fill() promoted as CANONICAL refill entry ## ENV Controls - HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1: Enable Front-Direct (SS→FC direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1: Same as above (alt name) - HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1: Enable batch refill (also enables Front-Direct) - HAKMEM_TINY_SFC_CASCADE=1: Enable SFC cascade (default OFF) - HAKMEM_TINY_INLINE_SLL=1: Enable inline SLL pop (default OFF, requires AGGRESSIVE_INLINE) ## Benchmarks (Front-Direct Enabled) ```bash ENV: HAKMEM_BENCH_FAST_FRONT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_FRONT_DIRECT=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_BATCH=1 HAKMEM_TINY_P0_DIRECT_FC_ALL=1 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_HOT=256 HAKMEM_TINY_REFILL_COUNT_MID=96 HAKMEM_TINY_BUMP_CHUNK=256 bench_random_mixed (16-1040B random, 200K iter): 256 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) 128 slots: 1.44M ops/s (STABLE, 0 SEGV) bench_fixed_size (fixed size, 200K iter): 256B: 4.06M ops/s (has debug logs, expected >10M without logs) 128B: Similar (debug logs affect) ``` ## Verification - TRACE_RING test (10K iter): **0 SLL events** detected ✅ - Complete SLL bypass confirmed when Front-Direct=1 - Stable execution: 200K iterations × multiple sizes, 0 SEGV ## Next Steps - Disable debug logs in hak_alloc_api.inc.h (call_num 14250-14280 range) - Re-benchmark with clean Release build (target: 10-15M ops/s) - 128/256B shortcut path optimization (FC hit rate improvement) Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com> Suggested-By: ultrathink
2025-11-14 05:41:49 +09:00
{
static int g_sll_ring_en = -1;
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en == -1, 0)) {
const char* r = getenv("HAKMEM_TINY_SLL_RING");
g_sll_ring_en = (r && *r && *r != '0') ? 1 : 0;
}
if (__builtin_expect(g_sll_ring_en, 0)) {
// aux encodes: high 8 bits = got, low 8 bits = expect
uintptr_t aux = ((uintptr_t)got << 8) | (uintptr_t)expect;
tiny_debug_ring_record(0x7F12 /*TLS_SLL_HDR_CORRUPT*/, (uint16_t)class_idx, base, aux);
}
}
return false;
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
#endif
}
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
}
#endif
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
// Read next via Box API.
void* next;
PTR_NEXT_READ("tls_pop", class_idx, base, 0, next);
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
#if !HAKMEM_BUILD_RELEASE
if (next && !validate_ptr_range(next, "tls_sll_pop_next")) {
fprintf(stderr,
"[TLS_SLL_POP] FATAL invalid next ptr cls=%d base=%p next=%p\n",
class_idx, base, next);
ptr_trace_dump_now("next_corruption");
Add Box I (Integrity), Box E (Expansion), and comprehensive P0 debugging infrastructure ## Major Additions ### 1. Box I: Integrity Verification System (NEW - 703 lines) - Files: core/box/integrity_box.h (267 lines), core/box/integrity_box.c (436 lines) - Purpose: Unified integrity checking across all HAKMEM subsystems - Features: * 4-level integrity checking (0-4, compile-time controlled) * Priority 1: TLS array bounds validation * Priority 2: Freelist pointer validation * Priority 3: TLS canary monitoring * Priority ALPHA: Slab metadata invariant checking (5 invariants) * Atomic statistics tracking (thread-safe) * Beautiful BOX_BOUNDARY design pattern ### 2. Box E: SuperSlab Expansion System (COMPLETE) - Files: core/box/superslab_expansion_box.h, core/box/superslab_expansion_box.c - Purpose: Safe SuperSlab expansion with TLS state guarantee - Features: * Immediate slab 0 binding after expansion * TLS state snapshot and restoration * Design by Contract (pre/post-conditions, invariants) * Thread-safe with mutex protection ### 3. Comprehensive Integrity Checking System - File: core/hakmem_tiny_integrity.h (NEW) - Unified validation functions for all allocator subsystems - Uninitialized memory pattern detection (0xa2, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xfe) - Pointer range validation (null-page, kernel-space) ### 4. P0 Bug Investigation - Root Cause Identified **Bug**: SEGV at iteration 28440 (deterministic with seed 42) **Pattern**: 0xa2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2 (uninitialized/ASan poisoning) **Location**: TLS SLL (Single-Linked List) cache layer **Root Cause**: Race condition or use-after-free in TLS list management (class 0) **Detection**: Box I successfully caught invalid pointer at exact crash point ### 5. Defensive Improvements - Defensive memset in SuperSlab allocation (all metadata arrays) - Enhanced pointer validation with pattern detection - BOX_BOUNDARY markers throughout codebase (beautiful modular design) - 5 metadata invariant checks in allocation/free/refill paths ## Integration Points - Modified 13 files with Box I/E integration - Added 10+ BOX_BOUNDARY markers - 5 critical integrity check points in P0 refill path ## Test Results (100K iterations) - Baseline: 7.22M ops/s - Hotpath ON: 8.98M ops/s (+24% improvement ✓) - P0 Bug: Still crashes at 28440 iterations (TLS SLL race condition) - Root cause: Identified but not yet fixed (requires deeper investigation) ## Performance - Box I overhead: Zero in release builds (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=0) - Debug builds: Full validation enabled (HAKMEM_INTEGRITY_LEVEL=4) - Beautiful modular design maintains clean separation of concerns ## Known Issues - P0 Bug at 28440 iterations: Race condition in TLS SLL cache (class 0) - Cause: Use-after-free or race in remote free draining - Next step: Valgrind investigation to pinpoint exact corruption location ## Code Quality - Total new code: ~1400 lines (Box I + Box E + integrity system) - Design: Beautiful Box Theory with clear boundaries - Modularity: Complete separation of concerns - Documentation: Comprehensive inline comments and BOX_BOUNDARY markers 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-12 02:45:00 +09:00
abort();
}
#endif
g_tls_sll[class_idx].head = next;
if (g_tls_sll[class_idx].count > 0) {
g_tls_sll[class_idx].count--;
}
// Clear next inside popped node to avoid stale-chain issues.
tiny_next_write(class_idx, base, NULL);
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
*out = base;
return true;
}
// ========== Splice ==========
//
// Splice a pre-linked chain of BASE pointers into TLS SLL head.
// chain_head is BASE; links are via Box API-compatible next layout.
// Returns number of nodes actually moved (<= capacity remaining).
static inline uint32_t tls_sll_splice(int class_idx,
void* chain_head,
uint32_t count,
uint32_t capacity)
{
HAK_CHECK_CLASS_IDX(class_idx, "tls_sll_splice");
if (!chain_head || count == 0 || capacity == 0) {
return 0;
}
Box API Phase 1-3: Capacity Manager, Carve-Push, Prewarm 実装 Priority 1-3のBox Modulesを実装し、安全なpre-warming APIを提供。 既存の複雑なprewarmコードを1行のBox API呼び出しに置き換え。 ## 新規Box Modules 1. **Box Capacity Manager** (capacity_box.h/c) - TLS SLL容量の一元管理 - adaptive_sizing初期化保証 - Double-free バグ防止 2. **Box Carve-And-Push** (carve_push_box.h/c) - アトミックなblock carve + TLS SLL push - All-or-nothing semantics - Rollback保証(partial failure防止) 3. **Box Prewarm** (prewarm_box.h/c) - 安全なTLS cache pre-warming - 初期化依存性を隠蔽 - シンプルなAPI (1関数呼び出し) ## コード簡略化 hakmem_tiny_init.inc: 20行 → 1行 ```c // BEFORE: 複雑なP0分岐とエラー処理 adaptive_sizing_init(); if (prewarm > 0) { #if HAKMEM_TINY_P0_BATCH_REFILL int taken = sll_refill_batch_from_ss(5, prewarm); #else int taken = sll_refill_small_from_ss(5, prewarm); #endif } // AFTER: Box API 1行 int taken = box_prewarm_tls(5, prewarm); ``` ## シンボルExport修正 hakmem_tiny.c: 5つのシンボルをstatic → non-static - g_tls_slabs[] (TLS slab配列) - g_sll_multiplier (SLL容量乗数) - g_sll_cap_override[] (容量オーバーライド) - superslab_refill() (SuperSlab再充填) - ss_active_add() (アクティブカウンタ) ## ビルドシステム Makefile: TINY_BENCH_OBJS_BASEに3つのBox modules追加 - core/box/capacity_box.o - core/box/carve_push_box.o - core/box/prewarm_box.o ## 動作確認 ✅ Debug build成功 ✅ Box Prewarm API動作確認 [PREWARM] class=5 requested=128 taken=32 ## 次のステップ - Box Refill Manager (Priority 4) - Box SuperSlab Allocator (Priority 5) - Release build修正(tiny_debug_ring_record) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-13 01:45:30 +09:00
uint32_t cur = g_tls_sll[class_idx].count;
if (cur >= capacity) {
return 0;
Box API Phase 1-3: Capacity Manager, Carve-Push, Prewarm 実装 Priority 1-3のBox Modulesを実装し、安全なpre-warming APIを提供。 既存の複雑なprewarmコードを1行のBox API呼び出しに置き換え。 ## 新規Box Modules 1. **Box Capacity Manager** (capacity_box.h/c) - TLS SLL容量の一元管理 - adaptive_sizing初期化保証 - Double-free バグ防止 2. **Box Carve-And-Push** (carve_push_box.h/c) - アトミックなblock carve + TLS SLL push - All-or-nothing semantics - Rollback保証(partial failure防止) 3. **Box Prewarm** (prewarm_box.h/c) - 安全なTLS cache pre-warming - 初期化依存性を隠蔽 - シンプルなAPI (1関数呼び出し) ## コード簡略化 hakmem_tiny_init.inc: 20行 → 1行 ```c // BEFORE: 複雑なP0分岐とエラー処理 adaptive_sizing_init(); if (prewarm > 0) { #if HAKMEM_TINY_P0_BATCH_REFILL int taken = sll_refill_batch_from_ss(5, prewarm); #else int taken = sll_refill_small_from_ss(5, prewarm); #endif } // AFTER: Box API 1行 int taken = box_prewarm_tls(5, prewarm); ``` ## シンボルExport修正 hakmem_tiny.c: 5つのシンボルをstatic → non-static - g_tls_slabs[] (TLS slab配列) - g_sll_multiplier (SLL容量乗数) - g_sll_cap_override[] (容量オーバーライド) - superslab_refill() (SuperSlab再充填) - ss_active_add() (アクティブカウンタ) ## ビルドシステム Makefile: TINY_BENCH_OBJS_BASEに3つのBox modules追加 - core/box/capacity_box.o - core/box/carve_push_box.o - core/box/prewarm_box.o ## 動作確認 ✅ Debug build成功 ✅ Box Prewarm API動作確認 [PREWARM] class=5 requested=128 taken=32 ## 次のステップ - Box Refill Manager (Priority 4) - Box SuperSlab Allocator (Priority 5) - Release build修正(tiny_debug_ring_record) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-13 01:45:30 +09:00
}
uint32_t room = capacity - cur;
uint32_t to_move = (count < room) ? count : room;
// Traverse chain up to to_move, validate, and find tail.
void* tail = chain_head;
uint32_t moved = 1;
tls_sll_debug_guard(class_idx, chain_head, "splice_head");
#if HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX
// Restore header defensively on each node we touch.
{
uint8_t* b = (uint8_t*)chain_head;
uint8_t expected = (uint8_t)(HEADER_MAGIC | (class_idx & HEADER_CLASS_MASK));
*b = expected;
}
#endif
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
while (moved < to_move) {
tls_sll_debug_guard(class_idx, tail, "splice_traverse");
void* next;
PTR_NEXT_READ("tls_splice_trav", class_idx, tail, 0, next);
if (!next) {
break;
}
#if HAKMEM_TINY_HEADER_CLASSIDX
{
uint8_t* b = (uint8_t*)next;
uint8_t expected = (uint8_t)(HEADER_MAGIC | (class_idx & HEADER_CLASS_MASK));
*b = expected;
}
#endif
Fix #16: Resolve double BASE→USER conversion causing header corruption 🎯 ROOT CAUSE: Internal allocation helpers were prematurely converting BASE → USER pointers before returning to caller. The caller then applied HAK_RET_ALLOC/tiny_region_id_write_header which performed ANOTHER BASE→USER conversion, resulting in double offset (BASE+2) and header written at wrong location. 📦 BOX THEORY SOLUTION: Establish clean pointer conversion boundary at tiny_region_id_write_header, making it the single source of truth for BASE → USER conversion. 🔧 CHANGES: - Fix #16: Remove premature BASE→USER conversions (6 locations) * core/tiny_alloc_fast.inc.h (3 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_refill.inc.h (2 fixes) * core/hakmem_tiny_fastcache.inc.h (1 fix) - Fix #12: Add header validation in tls_sll_pop (detect corruption) - Fix #14: Defense-in-depth header restoration in tls_sll_splice - Fix #15: USER pointer detection (for debugging) - Fix #13: Bump window header restoration - Fix #2, #6, #7, #8: Various header restoration & NULL termination 🧪 TEST RESULTS: 100% SUCCESS - 10K-500K iterations: All passed - 8 seeds × 100K: All passed (42,123,456,789,999,314,271,161) - Performance: ~630K ops/s average (stable) - Header corruption: ZERO 📋 FIXES SUMMARY: Fix #1-8: Initial header restoration & chain fixes (chatgpt-san) Fix #9-10: USER pointer auto-fix (later disabled) Fix #12: Validation system (caught corruption at call 14209) Fix #13: Bump window header writes Fix #14: Splice defense-in-depth Fix #15: USER pointer detection (debugging tool) Fix #16: Double conversion fix (FINAL SOLUTION) ✅ 🎓 LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Validation catches bugs early (Fix #12 was critical) 2. Class-specific inline logging reveals patterns (Option C) 3. Box Theory provides clean architectural boundaries 4. Multiple investigation approaches (Task/chatgpt-san collaboration) 📄 DOCUMENTATION: - P0_BUG_STATUS.md: Complete bug tracking timeline - C2_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE_FINAL.md: Detailed root cause analysis - FINAL_ANALYSIS_C2_CORRUPTION.md: Investigation methodology 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Task Agent <task@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: ChatGPT <chatgpt@openai.com>
2025-11-12 10:33:57 +09:00
tail = next;
moved++;
}
// Link tail to existing head and install new head.
tls_sll_debug_guard(class_idx, tail, "splice_tail");
PTR_NEXT_WRITE("tls_splice_link", class_idx, tail, 0, g_tls_sll[class_idx].head);
g_tls_sll[class_idx].head = chain_head;
g_tls_sll[class_idx].count = cur + moved;
return moved;
}
#endif // TLS_SLL_BOX_H