hakmem/FREELIST_CORRUPTION_ROOT_CAUSE.md

# FREELIST CORRUPTION ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
## Phase 6-2.5 SLAB0_DATA_OFFSET Investigation

### Executive Summary
The freelist corruption after changing SLAB0_DATA_OFFSET from 1024 to 2048 is **NOT caused by the offset change**. The root cause is a **use-after-free vulnerability** in the remote free queue combined with **massive double-frees**.

### Timeline
- **Initial symptom:** `[TRC_FAILFAST] stage=freelist_next cls=7 node=0x7e1ff3c1d474`
- **Investigation started:** After Phase 6-2.5 offset change
- **Root cause found:** Use-after-free in `ss_remote_push` + double-frees

### Root Cause Analysis

#### 1. Double-Free Epidemic
```bash
# Test reveals 180+ duplicate freed addresses
HAKMEM_WRAP_TINY=1 ./larson_hakmem 1 1 1024 1024 1 12345 1 | \
  grep "free_local_box" | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -d | wc -l
# Result: 180+ duplicates
```

#### 2. Use-After-Free Vulnerability
**Location:** `/mnt/workdisk/public_share/hakmem/core/hakmem_tiny_superslab.h:437`
```c
static inline int ss_remote_push(SuperSlab* ss, int slab_idx, void* ptr) {
    // ... validation ...
    do {
        old = atomic_load_explicit(head, memory_order_acquire);
        if (!g_remote_side_enable) {
            *(void**)ptr = (void*)old;  // ← WRITES TO POTENTIALLY ALLOCATED MEMORY!
        }
    } while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_explicit(...));
}
```

#### 3. The Attack Sequence
1. Thread A frees block X → pushed to remote queue (next pointer written)
2. Thread B (owner) drains remote queue → adds X to freelist
3. Thread B allocates X → application starts using it
4. Thread C double-frees X → **corrupts active user memory**
5. User writes data including `0x6261` pattern
6. Freelist traversal interprets user data as next pointer → **CRASH**

### Evidence

#### Corrupted Pointers
- `0x7c1b4a606261` - User data ending with 0x6261 pattern
- `0x6261` - Pure user data, no valid address
- Pattern `0x6261` detected as "TLS guard scribble" in code

#### Debug Output
```
[TRC_FREELIST_LOG] stage=free_local_box cls=7 node=0x7da27ec0b800 next=0x7da27ec0bc00
[TRC_FREELIST_LOG] stage=free_local_box cls=7 node=0x7da27ec0b800 next=0x7da27ec04000
                                                     ^^^^^^^^^^^ SAME ADDRESS FREED TWICE!
```

#### Remote Queue Activity
```
[DEBUG ss_remote_push] Call #1 ss=0x735d23e00000 slab_idx=0
[DEBUG ss_remote_push] Call #2 ss=0x735d23e00000 slab_idx=5
[TRC_FAILFAST] stage=freelist_next cls=7 node=0x6261
```

### Why SLAB0_DATA_OFFSET Change Exposed This

The offset change from 1024 to 2048 didn't cause the bug but may have:
1. Changed memory layout/timing
2. Made corruption more visible
3. Affected which blocks get double-freed
4. The bug existed before but was latent

### Attempted Mitigations

#### 1. Enable Safe Free (COMPLETED)
```c
// core/hakmem_tiny.c:39
int g_tiny_safe_free = 1;  // ULTRATHINK FIX: Enable by default
```
**Result:** Still crashes - race condition persists

#### 2. Required Fixes (PENDING)
- Add ownership validation before writing next pointer
- Implement proper memory barriers
- Add atomic state tracking for blocks
- Consider hazard pointers or epoch-based reclamation

### Reproduction
```bash
# Immediate crash with SuperSlab enabled
HAKMEM_WRAP_TINY=1 ./larson_hakmem 1 1 1024 1024 1 12345 1

# Works fine without SuperSlab
HAKMEM_WRAP_TINY=0 ./larson_hakmem 1 1 1024 1024 1 12345 1
```

### Recommendations

1. **IMMEDIATE:** Do not use in production
2. **SHORT-TERM:** Disable remote free queue (`HAKMEM_TINY_DISABLE_REMOTE=1`)
3. **LONG-TERM:** Redesign lock-free MPSC with safe memory reclamation

### Technical Details

#### Memory Layout (Class 7, 1024-byte blocks)
```
SuperSlab base: 0x7c1b4a600000
Slab 0 start:   0x7c1b4a600000 + 2048 = 0x7c1b4a600800
Block 0:        0x7c1b4a600800
Block 1:        0x7c1b4a600c00
Block 42:       0x7c1b4a60b000 (offset 43008 from slab 0 start)
```

#### Validation Points
- Offset 2048 is correct (aligns to 1024-byte blocks)
- `sizeof(SuperSlab) = 1088` requires 2048-byte alignment
- All legitimate blocks ARE properly aligned
- Corruption comes from use-after-free, not misalignment

### Conclusion

The HAKMEM allocator has a **critical memory safety bug** in its lock-free remote free queue. The bug allows:
- Use-after-free corruption
- Double-free vulnerabilities
- Memory corruption of active allocations

This is a **SECURITY VULNERABILITY** that could be exploited for arbitrary code execution.

### Author
Claude Opus 4.1 (ULTRATHINK Mode)
Analysis Date: 2025-11-07